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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Let's not underestimate the problem we face. American employers may not have a solution to 
the long-term crisis of the world economy, but they have developed a coherent strategy to weaken the 
labor movement. Through a combination of concessions bargaining, plant shutdowns, capital mobility, 
and probusiness government policies, they have succeeded in intimidating unions and dividing workers. 
As a result, the labor movement grows weaker, and workers lose what little protection they now have for 
their standard of living and basic rights. 
Unions will become a marginal force in society unless the labor movement develops a viable strategy for 
responding to these employer attacks. The current program and policies of most sections of the trade 
union leadership are clearly inadequate. The labor movement urgently needs a new strategy. 
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The Case 
Against 
Worker 
Ownership 
• Mike Slott 
Let's not underestimate the problem we face. American 
employers may not have a solution to the long-term crisis of the 
world economy, but they have developed a coherent strategy to 
weaken the labor movement. Through a combination of conces-
sions bargaining, plant shutdowns, capital mobility, and pro-
business government policies, they have succeeded in intimidating 
unions and dividing workers. As a result, the labor movement 
grows weaker, and workers lose what little protection they now 
have for their standard of living and basic rights. 
Unions will become a marginal force in society unless the labor 
movement develops a viable strategy for responding to these 
employer attacks. The current program and policies of most 
sections of the trade union leadership are clearly inadequate. The 
labor movement urgently needs a new strategy. 
In recent years worker ownership has emerged as one of several 
alternative strategies being discussed by labor activists. While 
employee-owned businesses comprise an insignificant part of the 
economy, there have been a growing number of employee buy-
outs of companies. Several worker cooperatives have also been 
formed. The idea of union-controlled pension funds has gained 
some popularity. Advocates of worker ownership have both 
encouraged these trends and been heartened by them. In their 
• Mike Slott is a field organizer in the Philadelphia area for the United Electrical, 
Radio & Machine Workers of America (UEJ; from 1979 to 1983, he was a shop 
steward in District 1199C of the National Union of Hospital & Health Care 
Employees. 
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view, they represent the potential for a much greater development 
of worker control. 
Clearly, worker ownership merits serious consideration as an 
alternative to the current strategy of union leaders. Both 
theoretical and empirical issues need to be debated thoroughly 
by those of us who are searching for ways to revitalize the labor 
movement. Preliminary to any critical discussion of worker owner-
ship, however, one must make clear the criteria used to evaluate 
current strategies and alternatives to them. 
A strategy should be supported only if it has the overall effect 
of strengthening the labor movement by enabling workers to fight 
more effectively against their employers. Such a strategy increases 
the power, unity, and self-confidence of rank-and-file workers. A 
strategy which strengthens one group of workers while hurting 
the rest can only be harmful to labor. Any strategy must be 
evaluated with respect to its impact on the whole working class. 
To the extent that advocates of worker ownership share these 
assumptions, my disagreement with them is not over basic goals, 
but over their belief that worker ownership is actually a means 
of strengthening the labor movement. 
Other people support worker ownership not as a means of 
strengthening labor, but as a way to foster labor-management 
cooperation and give workers a greater stake in the capitalist 
system. For example, the ideology of labor-management 
cooperation underlies Worker Participation and Ownership, a book 
written by several academic supporters of worker ownership. They 
believe that the United States will only be able to compete 
effectively in the world market if workers have more of a say in 
making economic decisions. Through participation schemes and 
expanded employee ownership, workers will become more 
productive and concerned about the profitability of companies. 
Similarly, Corey Rosen, executive director of the National Center 
for Employee Ownership, touts worker ownership in business 
journals as a motivational tool for employers. According to Rosen, 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) can lead to increased 
productivity while providing tax benefits to the employer. 
That worker ownership has an ambiguous appeal is not a 
definitive argument against it. But it does suggest that worker 
ownership may not necessarily be in the best interests of the labor 
movement. The historical and theoretical overview of worker 
ownership on the following pages provides even stronger reasons 
for questioning current attempts to create employee-owned 
companies and worker cooperatives. 
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The historical record of worker ownership is far from dazzling. 
On the whole, producer cooperatives (co-ops), the main form 
of worker ownership until the 20th Century, have never been a 
significant part of any national economy. To be sure, there were 
periods when the co-op idea gained some measure of popularity. 
The Knights of Labor, for example, advocated producer co-ops and 
its local branches sponsored approximately 200 co-ops in the 
1880s, but the co-op sector of the economy remained quite tiny. 
In general, co-ops were and are found in industries such as 
printing, construction, and clothing, where modern versions of 
craft work still survive. 
The Mondragon co-ops in the Basque region of Spain are an 
exception to this pattern. Founded in 1956, Mondragon has 
become a diversified and growing network of producer, 
commercial, and consumer co-ops. In 1983 it employed 20,000 
people in 100 enterprises. Two of its co-ops, Danobat and ULGOR, 
are, respectively, Spain's largest producers of machine tools and 
consumer appliances. No one can deny that Mondragon has been 
an economic success while maintaining its basic cooperative 
structure. 
Mondragon's achievement makes a fascinating story, but 
Mondragon has little relevance for evaluating the viability of 
worker ownership as a defensive trade union strategy. In fact, from 
the beginning, Mondragon has had little or no connection with 
Spain's union movement. The co-ops were initiated in the late 
1950's, at a time when the dictator Francisco Franco had outlawed 
unions and all other forms of independent working class activity. 
Part of the impetus for Mondragon's development may have been 
the desire to create a socially acceptable institution which still 
promoted the interests of workers. Even after Franco died and 
unions were legalized, it appears that Mondragon was not part 
of the reform movement which swept Spain in the late 1970s. 
Union membership in the co-ops remained tiny. If Mondragon 
points to the potential for worker self-management, it has little 
to say about how worker ownership can strengthen unions. 
A new form of worker ownership, developed in Germany early 
in the 20th Century, is intimately connected to German labor 
unions. The West German trade union federation, DGB, owns a 
huge business empire, including the largest property development 
company in Europe, the second largest life insurance company 
in West Germany, and the ninth largest commercial bank in the 
country. The DGB is also part-owner of the consumer Co-op 
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Zentrale. These union-owned, or "commonweal" enterprises 
employ 40,000 workers, making the DGB one of West Germany's 
largest employers. 
The main impact of the commonweal enterprises has been to 
foster competition in several industries which were once 
controlled by large firms notorious for their monopolistic practices. 
While the union-owned companies have benefitted consumers in 
the housing, banking and insurance industries, they are not a 
model of union radicalism or a source of power. Far from it. First, 
these companies are as hierarchically structured as any traditional 
business. More importantly, they have played no role in the current 
fight for a shorter work week, perhaps the most vital labor struggle 
waged since World War II. Like Mondragon, the DGB enterprises 
are not a model of a defensive strategy for the labor movement. 
Viewed historically, worker ownership is, for the most part, 
insignificant in relation to the national economies. In the two cases 
where worker ownership is more important, Germany and Spain, 
it doesn't offer a strategy for defending the labor movement, much 
less for contributing to the development of working class 
insurgency. Why has worker ownership been an economic and 
strategic dead-end? 
The potential for worker ownership is severely limited by the 
structure of capitalist economies. All of the vital sectors of the 
economy are already owned and controlled by the capitalist class; 
in the absence of a mass political movement, they can block any 
attempt by workers to make significant economic inroads on their 
power. Workers simply lack the financial resources to challenge 
employer domination of the "commanding heights" of the 
economy. 
Given this lack of resources, worker ownership will be limited 
to the "crumbs" of the economy: either to certain labor-intensive 
industries (the traditional co-op sector) or to financially-troubled 
companies. In either context, worker-owned companies face 
serious problems. Many are bound to fail economically due to a 
lack of capital and/or poor market conditions. The ones that 
survive may be taken over by investors looking for a profitable 
place to put their money. A final scenario is one in which worker 
ownership survives, but as a non-threatening, marginal part of the 
economy. 
Worker ownership is not only economically unfeasible. Its 
overall impact on the labor movement is negative. 
Worker-ownership ventures channel workers' energy away from 
economic and political struggle with their employers. The 
precarious position of employee-owned companies in the economy 
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requires workers to put most of their effort into two basic tasks: 
raising the capital to buy the company and start it up; and, 
competing successfully against other businesses. The whole 
orientation of workers is shifted from militant confrontation with 
their employers to survival in the marketplace. Thus, insofar as 
worker-ownership diverts workers' activity from struggle, it 
doesn't strengthen the labor movement. 
When worker-ownership consists of isolated employee-owned 
companies, as it does in this country, this approach does even 
worse damage to unions. One of the basic components of trade 
unionism is the idea that workers achieve strength through unity, 
that solidarity is the basis upon which unions can fight effectively 
for their demands. In the current economic and political context, 
worker-ownership strikes at the heart of union solidarity. 
It does so in two related ways. In the first place, workers who 
gain ownership of a company tend, over a period of time, to 
identify less with workers employed by other companies than with 
the company they now own. 
Edward Greenberg's study of producer cooperatives in the 
Pacific Northwest plywood industry supports this assertion. 
Greenberg found that co-op members were more likely to 
" . . . support systems of hierarchical social relations, and to identify 
themselves as Republicans and members of the middle class." This 
is because they are "in a situation where short-term self-interest 
is tied to the economic well-being of the enterprise based on 
market performance and where the powerful influence of the 
market mechanism is not counterbalanced." 
Worker ownership is also divisive because it undermines union 
standards. Most employee buy-outs have occurred as part of a 
concessions deal. In order to save jobs and prevent a plant closing, 
workers agree to major wage-and-benefit reductions and a 
weakening of traditional work rules. In exchange, the workers buy 
out the owners and gain employee ownership. This seems like a 
perfectly reasonable deal: concessions for ownership. Yet, while 
the concessions save jobs in the short-run, they hurt workers in 
the rest of the labor movement. Lower wages and benefits at the 
employee-owned company put pressure on other employers (or 
give them the excuse) to seek wage reductions at their companies. 
As a result, workers end up competing with each other to offer 
employers the lowest labor costs. 
Industry-wide union contracts aim to prevent such competition 
by creating uniform wages, benefits and working conditions. 
Unfortunately, uniform standards have already been seriously 
eroded in several industries because of concessions bargaining by 
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union leaders. When worker ownership is achieved in exchange 
for concessions, it further erodes industry standards. 
The pitfalls of worker ownership are evident when one examines 
several employee-owned businesses which were recently 
established in the United States. Advocates of worker ownership 
have sometimes pointed to these companies as examples of the 
potential of worker ownership. In reality, they show that worker 
ownership is not a viable strategy for the labor movement. 
Current Cases 
Worker ownership is primarily used in this country not as a means 
of saving workers' jobs, but as a management ploy to increase 
profits. In the vast majority of the estimated 6,000 companies 
which have some degree of employee ownership, management 
has initiated ESOPs to improve employee motivation and gain 
certain tax advantages. Typically, workers own only a small 
percentage of the company's stock and have no control over the 
company's policies. 
Workers have more significant ownership and control in some 
companies, although the extent of workplace democracy varies 
widely. Several ESOPs, including those at Weirton Steel and Hyatt-
Clark Industries (HCI), give workers majority or full ownership, 
but severely limit their ability to vote their stock shares and control 
management. Rath Packing is the best-known example of a 
company with a more democratically-structured ESOP. At the 
other extreme, the O & O supermarkets are one of the few genuine 
worker cooperatives in the country. 
Several writers in this issue of Labor Research Review discuss 
in detail the history of some of these companies. Other articles 
deal with technical and legal aspects of worker ownership. I want 
to focus instead on their economic prospects and their impact on 
the labor movement. 
The employee buy-out of Weirton Steel was promoted by the 
previous owner, National Steel. For a number of reasons, the 
conglomerate wanted to unload the Weirton plant and opted for 
employee ownership when it couldn't find a corporate buyer. 
Desperate to save their jobs, the workers agreed to a 20% wage-
and-benefit reduction in return for gaining ownership of the plant. 
Beyond the formal transfer of ownership, however, little has 
changed. Management retains control of the Board of Directors 
and the company's daily operations. Workers can't even vote their 
own stock shares. 
The structure of the ESOP and a six-year labor contract which 
prohibits strikes and wage increases insure management control 
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in the years ahead. Furthermore, by agreeing to such major wage-
and-benefit cutbacks, the workers have set a precedent for 
additional wage concessions in the steel industry. The bosses can 
now point to Weirton's labor costs in the next six years as the 
"competitive" rate for all employers. 
Hyatt Clark Industries (HCI), a tapered bearings plant in Clark, 
New Jersey, has an ESOP similar to Weirton's. The HCIESOP was 
shaped to a large extent by General Motors, the former owner of 
the plant, and the banks who loaned the money for the buy-out. 
In a letter distributed to HCI employees in April 1984, Alan 
Lowenstein, chairperson of the Board of Directors, noted that 
". . .the business and financial leaders who were in a position to 
decide whether the company [i.e., the employees] could purchase 
the plant. . . insisted that the company be controlled by an 
independent board of directors as a condition of the purchase of 
the plant, and the $53 million of debt used for that purpose." HCI 
workers, represented by UAW Local 736, now have three people 
out of thirteen on the Board. They will not gain equal 
representation until 1991. 
Despite the undemocratic ESOP, worker morale was high when 
the ESOP was initiated in October 1981. But, in the last year, 
tension between management and the workers has grown 
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considerably. The demand for HCI's product, tapered bearings, 
is declining steadily as auto manufacturers switch from rear- to 
front-wheel drive cars. Management has responded to the 
company's shaky economic prospects with demands for greater 
productivity and sacrifices by workers. UAW Local 736 was once 
one of the most militant locals in the area, but now it seems caught 
between management's push for more production and the 
workers' growing dissatisfaction, which has been expressed in two 
slow-downs and the sabotage of several machines. 
Contract negotiations between the local and management in Fall 
1984 reflected both the high level of worker discontent and 
General Motors' dominant influence. Initially, the negotiators 
made little progress as both sides blamed each other for HCI's 
faltering performance. At that point, GM intervened in the 
negotiations and demanded that the union agree to a no-strike 
guarantee. GM then threatened to cancel its purchases of the 
company's bearings if an agreement was not reached on this issue. 
Since GM purchases nearly 90% of HCI's output, Local 736 and 
HCI management worked feverishly to come up with an 
agreement that would satisfy GM. 
Whether HCI will make it through the end of the decade is 
unclear. What is more certain is the Hyatt ESOP's impact on other 
UAW workers. GM's support for the buy-out was motivated less 
by concern for the workers' jobs than its calculation that the ESOP 
was a way of forcing concessions in the plant, which, in turn, could 
be used to pressure workers in other parts plants to make 
concessions. (In exchange for ownership, the workers accepted 
a 30% reduction in wages and benefits.) In fact, GM threatened 
to shut down the Fisher Body Division hardware factory in nearby 
Trenton, New Jersey, only three months after the HCI ESOP was 
finalized. The Trenton UAW Local agreed to changes in shift 
assignments and job classifications to prevent the plant from 
closing. 
Of course, the HCI ESOP didn't start the concessions trend in 
the auto industry and cannot be seen as the basic cause of disunity 
in the UAW. Still, to the extent that the ESOP contributes to the 
dynamic of concessions, it is harmful to the labor movement. In 
a similar way, employee ownership at Rath Packing in Waterloo, 
Iowa, exacerbates the problems facing the United Food and 
Commercial Workers (UFCW) in the meat processing and packing 
industry. 
Currently, Rath is teetering on the brink of collapse. Squeezed 
between cheap labor, non-union firms and powerful conglom-
erates, Rath has gone steadily downhill in the last couple of years. 
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The bright hopes present at the time of the employee buy-out in 
June 1980 are now all but gone. The company is in Chapter 11 
bankruptcy, lay-offs have occurred, the union contract has been 
gutted, and workers are embittered by management policies of 
speed-up and concessions bargaining. Workers went on a wildcat 
strike in May 1984. A month later, 1800 workers picketed the plant 
to protest working conditions. 
Rath was a model for many advocates of worker ownership 
because its ESOP was relatively democratic and provided 
mechanisms for worker input. Yet, no matter how democratic an 
ESOP is, it can't prevent a company from failing if it faces, as Rath 
does, poor market conditions and a lack of capital. Ironically, 
Rath's current president, Lyle Taylor, was formerly the head of 
the union at the plant (UFCW Local 46) and the main force behind 
the ESOP. Once a trade union militant fighting for workers, he 
has become a hard-nosed executive who is willing to cripple the 
union to insure the survival of the company. Employee ownership 
in this desperate economic context has become the opposite of 
what the workers and Lyle Taylor had hoped to achieve. 
Unfortunately, employee buy-outs are more likely to occur in 
just those companies which have shaky economic prospects. Why 
else would employers be willing to sell the plant to workers? Not 
all buy-outs will result in bankruptcy, but many will. 
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As the Mondragon cooperatives indicate, there are exceptions 
to this generally dismal outlook. The O & O ("Owned and 
Operated" by employees) supermarkets in the Philadelphia area 
may be one if their solid economic performance since their 
opening in October 1982 is a barometer of their long-term 
prospects. 
The O & O supermarkets were established as part of a 
concessions deal between the A & P supermarket chain and 
UFCW Local 1357. Claiming they weren't making enough profit, 
A & P closed over 20 stores in the Philadelphia area in March 1982. 
The union and A & P then negotiated a concessions package which 
saved workers' jobs while lowering labor costs. Local 1357 agreed 
to major cuts in wages and benefits and a sharp increase in the 
number of part-time workers. In exchange, A & P agreed to reopen 
the stores as a new auxiliary, called Super Fresh. Workers would 
receive bonuses based on a percentage of gross sales and a worker 
participation program would be instituted. Additionally, the local 
got the first right to buy out any stores that closed in the future. 
Two of the old A & P stores were immediately bought by the 
union; these became the O & O cooperatives. 
Currently, the O & O co-ops have 45 worker-owners. Despite 
some initial problems, the co-ops are doing well financially; their 
success has paved the way for a third co-op, planned to open 
January 1985 in a poor, black neighborhood. According to Andrew 
Lamas, a staffperson of the Philadelphia Association of 
Cooperative Enterprises (PACE), this co-op will have 85 worker-
owners, many from the surrounding community. 
PACE and the union are enthusiastic about the prospects for a 
further development of the O & O cooperatives. They believe that, 
as the big supermarket chains abandon the city for more profitable 
suburban markets, there will be an opening for small- to medium-
sized supermarkets in the inner city. Using Mondragon as a model, 
they envision a chain of cooperatives united by an umbrella 
organization which provides financing and technical services. 
Their optimistic assessment is reflected in Lamas' contention that 
"O & O has become a job-creating strategy, not just a reaction to 
shutdowns. This takes O & O on to the second plateau." 
Let us assume, for a moment, that O & O is moving to a new 
stage of development. What has been its effect on the labor 
movement and what role will it have in the future? 
In response to the union's concessions at A & P, other 
supermarket chains have sought similar concessions. In contract 
negotiations which ended August 1984, Acme supermarkets 
demanded wage-and-benefit cuts too. While Local 1357 was able 
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to stop major concessions, the union consented to a wage freeze 
in the first year of the contract, a reduction of Sunday overtime 
from double time to time-and-a-half, and the loss of a holiday. The 
A & P concessions clearly had a negative impact on these 
negotiations. 
O & O can't be seen merely as an innovative form of worker 
ownership; it has to be evaluated in the context of declining union 
strength in the local grocery industry. O & O may, in the future, 
give 500 worker owners an opportunity to run their own 
businesses, but the overall condition of workers in the industry 
will have declined. Instead of organizing a militant, rank-and-file 
response which might have benefited all the workers, the union 
opted for a strategy which will positively affect only a small 
percentage of its members. 
Even if a chain of supermarket cooperatives is created, it is 
bound to be as isolated from the key struggles of workers as are 
Mondragon and the commonweal enterprises. Although the co-op 
members and the union contribute part of the co-ops' start-up 
costs, O & O is in a large part dependent on loans from banks and 
the government. In addition, O & O receives its groceries and other 
services from IGA, a wholesaler which is trying to organize its 
own distribution and retailing network. None of these sources of 
financial and material support desire a strong labor movement. 
The banks want a safe investment; the government, a larger tax 
base; IGA, a bigger share of the grocery industry. They will help 
O & O only as long as they believe that the co-ops' structures and 
goals don't threaten their interests. It is wishful thinking to believe 
that the O & O can act as a catalyst for social change or as a model 
for a new labor response to plant closings. 
To summarize: In the context of employer domination of the 
economy and a weak labor movement, worker ownership is not 
a solution to labor's problems. Because the O & O and the ESOP-
based forms of worker ownership divert workers' activity into 
projects which will either fail economically or be coopted by the 
system, they don't strengthen labor. Worse, they can be an 
additional source of disunity for the working class already 
hampered by sexual, racial, and occupational divisions. Unions 
need an entirely different strategy. 
Alternative Union Strategies 
At the heart of an alternative strategy to fight plant closings is the 
notion that the union's most effective weapon is the organized 
power of rank-and-file workers. In contrast to the AFL-CIO's 
emphasis on gaining influence with "labor's friends" in the 
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political arena, what's needed is a grass-roots revitalization of the 
labor movement, from the union local up to the level of the 
international union and the AFL-CIO. 
Effective resistance at the local level requires the union to have 
an active and informed membership which is prepared, in 
advance, to respond to the company's action. It's a sad 
commentary on the current state of the labor movement that the 
basics of democratic trade unionism—a strong shop steward 
system, elected and accountable leadership, education and training 
for members, a lively and relevant newsletter—have to be 
emphasized over and over again. But it's absolutely necessary to 
do so, for in the absence of an active membership, the union's 
response is bound to be half-hearted and ineffectual. 
A democratic local will be better able to respond with an array 
of militant tactics which put economic and political pressure on 
the employer. Clearly, the value of these tactics is not just that 
they're militant, but that they provide the union with increased 
leverage. At the same time, the tactics need to be carefully selected, 
based on what makes sense in the specific situation facing the 
union. Depending on the circumstances, the local can initiate 
work-to-rule actions, demonstrations, sit-down strikes, or any 
number of other responses. In addition to its own militant 
activities, the local needs to solicit support from other local unions 
and from community organizations. Their assistance can take the 
form of symbolic support rallies or of more direct kinds of aid. 
The aim of all these efforts is to bring together the largest and 
most cohesive force opposed to lay-offs and plant shutdowns. 
As a result of such militant tactics and the local's thorough 
research of the company's financial situation, the employer will 
be more likely to deal seriously with the union. A determined 
posture on the part of the local will at least force the company 
to present a relatively true picture of their economic prospects. 
If the company was bluffing, it will probably back down from its 
threats. But if the company does have serious problems, the local 
can offer a number of proposals which avoid lay-offs and a plant 
shutdown. 
Initially, the local can demand that management eliminate waste 
and inefficiency in their own ranks before asking workers to make 
sacrifices. The union can also suggest ways of improving 
productivity which don't worsen working conditions or weaken 
work rules. 
At a later stage, assuming that the corporate concessions 
approach hasn't solved the problem, the local can wage a campaign 
for government aid to keep the plant in operation. What levels 
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of government should be involved and what kind of aid offered 
(loan, subsidy, or grant) will, of course, vary case by case. 
Government aid may be linked to a proposal for a conversion of 
the company's product line from, for example, obsolete military 
hardware to socially useful domestic products. Given the 
reluctance of government to subsidize businesses—unless 
substantial corporate interests are at stake—this approach requires 
the union to mobilize massive outside support to get the funds. 
Nonetheless, it is a serious alternative for locals to consider. United 
Electrical Workers (UE) Local 277, which represents workers at 
the Morse Cutting Tool plant in New Bedford, Massachusetts, 
asked the city to use its right of eminent domain to take over the 
plant after Gulf + Western threatened to shut it down. Municipal 
and regional ownership established through eminent domain has 
also been proposed by the Tri-State Conference on Steel to salvage 
the steel industry in the Monongahela Valley. These new 
approaches need to be developed as part of an overall response 
to plant closings. 
Finally, if, despite all these efforts, the plant is still going to shut 
down, the local should get the most they can from the company 
before it closes the plant. Workers should receive the maximum 
level of health, pension, severance, and retraining benefits. If 
workers are going to lose their jobs, they should at least leave with 
as much economic security and dignity as the local can obtain. 
While militant tactics and innovative proposals at the local level 
are crucial, the union's response cannot just be a local one. A union 
local fighting a conglomerate or a large corporation often lacks 
the resources to win against an adversary who can shift production 
to different locations or invest in other industries. An effective 
response to plant closings requires that all levels of the labor 
movement develop an alternative strategy. 
Furthermore, union solidarity and coordination allow labor to 
gain greater collective control of the economy. The solution to 
plant closings and unemployment lies not in making individual 
plants profitable through wage cuts and employee buy-outs, but 
in changing the basic patterns of capital investment and economic 
power. When each level of the union movement—local, 
international union, federation—is part of an overall strategy, labor 
has the potential to exert some control over the general direction 
of the economy. 
International unions have a key role to play in an alternative 
strategy. They can provide assistance to locals fighting plant 
closings, and they can help to create a contractual framework in 
which plant shutdowns, when they do occur, are less painful for 
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workers. They can achieve these aims if they focus their efforts 
in the following areas: 
Maintaining Unity and Industry-Wide Standards. The 
international's main task is to stop employers from pitting one local 
against another. The international should oppose concessions 
bargaining which leads to the erosion of industry standards. Locals 
which are facing concessions demands should be backed up all 
the way by the international; such assistance may include 
solidarity strikes. All workers in the union should be educated and 
organized to fight concessions. 
Industry-Wide Job Security. Master contracts in an industry 
not only reduce competition between workers; they can soften 
the impact of plant closings by including provisions for: 1) pension 
portability between companies in the industry; 2) retraining 
programs for laid-off workers; 3) expanded severance, health, 
pension, and supplemental unemployment benefits; and 4) job 
relocation rights. 
Restrictions on Capital Investment/Movement. In 
conjuntion with the locals, the international should fight for 
specific contractual constraints which reduce the problems of 
capital flight and disinvestment. The international should also seek 
legislation and/or contractual language requiring advance 
notification of plant closings. 
Government Aid/Product Conversions. The international 
should provide technical assistance and use its political influence 
to help locals that are trying to obtain government funds to prevent 
a plant closing. Economic reconversion and other innovative 
responses to lay-offs should be supported. 
Each of these elements of an international union strategy have 
already been tried, to some extent, by at least a few unions. Not 
all unions have gone along with concessions bargaining. The idea 
of contractual limits on capital mobility and investment has gained 
increasing labor support and is seen by some as the next frontier 
in contract bargaining. Economic reconversion has gained the 
endorsement of the Machinists and several other unions. Thus, 
a section of the labor movement is groping toward a more effective 
response to plant closings; these initial steps can lay the basis for 
developing an alternative strategy. 
Reforming the AFL-CIO's bureaucratic structure will be perhaps 
the most difficult task of all. Unlikely as it may seem now, the 
AFL-CIO can act as a force to unite the labor movement around 
a program which strengthens workers' rights and creates jobs. A 
strategy for dealing with plant closings at the national level should 
include the following: 
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Jobs Programs. The AFL-CIO should lead the fight for a 
massive public works program to alleviate unemployment. A 
shorter work week, without a reduction in pay, is another essential 
jobs-creating program which the AFL-CIO should actively support. 
Nationalization. Declining industries which can only be 
"saved" at the cost of huge job losses and widespread shutdowns 
should be taken over by the government and subsidized so that 
they can provide jobs and meet important social needs. 
Pension Fund Investments. Unions have virtually no control 
over the approximately $ 1 trillion in pension fund assets in this 
country. Even partial union control over this capital would give 
workers an important tool for restricting employer prerogatives. 
The AFL-CIO should mount a nation-wide campaign for worker 
control of pension funds. 
International Solidarity. Instead of calling for trade barriers 
to protect American workers against foreign goods, the AFL-CIO 
should promote solidarity and resist the attempts of multi-national 
companies and governments to divide workers by nationality. 
Clearly, a 30-hour work week and union control of pension 
funds are not practical alternatives today. But these and other 
innovative programs to deal with plant closings can become a part 
of labor's agenda if the union movement is revitalized from the 
local up to the AFL-CIO. A small, but growing section of the labor 
movement sees the need for a new direction. Several locals have 
successfully resisted concessions by organizing their members and 
waging a militant struggle. Labor activists have begun to propose 
specific ideas for limiting employer prerogatives as part of a 
broader strategy to empower rank-and-file workers. It is through 
these admittedly exceptional efforts, and not through employee 
ownership ventures which play into the concessions dynamic, that 
the labor movement can regain its strength and become a 
progressive, social force. • 
Notes 
I'd like to thank Rube Singer, former president of the Hyatt UAW local, for some 
valuable information on the Hyatt-Clark ESOR Andrew Lamas of PACE provided 
me with background material on the O & O co-ops. Of course, he does not share 
my assessment of O & O. 
While some of the elements of an alternative strategy to fight plant closings are 
based on my own experience in the labor movement, others can be found, in a 
somewhat different form, in a Labor Notes publication, Concessions—and How 
to Beat Them (1983) by Jane Slaughter. I highly recommend this book to all labor 
activists. 
Finally, I'd like to thank David Bensman and Andy Feffer for their valuable 
suggestions on how to make this article more cogent. 
